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ABSTRACT
Multi-level security is prevalent within the military; however, the private sector has
not yet invested in the approach. As big data, Internet of things, and artificial intelligence
drive businesses to collaborate (share data, algorithms, and tools) the need to secure
such resources while simultaneously sharing them will push towards an alternative
approach-–namely Multi-level security. The military labels data according to the
sensitivity it carries as related to national security. Furthermore, the military restricts
access by both the overall trust in the individual and by their need-to-know. To put it
another way, data has a certain level of sensitivity and only those individuals that can be
trusted with the data and have a need-to-know shall have access to such data. Military
organizations not only limit access to digital data but also to sensitive discussions, often
having sensitive talks within a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility referred to
as a SCIF. Irrespective of the media, all data must be secured and disseminated in order to
produce value. Inaccessible data has no real value, as data must be accessible in order to
be actionable and produce value. Along the same lines, data often requires aggregation to
become actionable.
Creating a security domain with multiple levels of trust and need-to-know ensures
that data can both be accessed and aggregated. Multi-level secure domains exist in
military organizations today, however, the challenge arises when two domains want
to share data—hence the need for multi-level secure data dissemination. One way to
accomplish this objective is for Domain X to contact Domain Y and together identify
how their two security domains can map to one another. After determining the mapping
Domain X can send Domain Y data, however, what if Domain Z wants access to the
same data? Should Domain Z request the data from Domain Y? Would Domain Y violate
iii
the trust of Domain X, if Domain Y disseminates the data? Perhaps, Domain Z is only
cleared to a portion of the data. These are the issues related to the dissemination of MLS
data within a multi-domain environment.
The objective of this project is to propose a solution that would allow domains
to securely disseminate data without the need to repackage the data for each domain.
The solution outlined in this project, leverages Simple Public Key certificates, Active
Bundle, and a directory server. When combined, the three technologies allow domains:
to convey both trust and authorization policies, learn about trust and authorization policies
of external domains, and provide a mechanism to securely disseminate data.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Motivation
The issues of both securely storing and securely processing of sensitive data are
paramount in a variety of sectors. Recent events highlight several security related issues.
For example:
• Vatileaks (Wooden, 2012)
• Marriott Data Breach (Sanger, Perlroth, Thrush, and Rappeport, 2018)
• 2016 Presidential Campaign Hacking (“2016 Presidential Campaign Hacking Fast
Facts”, 2019)
• Snowden’s disclosures
Moreover, technological progress along with the need to process, store, and share an
ever-increasing amount of data brings about distributed systems capable of processing
data from smart sensors and networks. We use applications and devices that constantly
track and collect our personal information, these systems should be properly protected,
and access limited to individuals with valid authorizations (Liguori, 2016). To achieve
these objectives, many organizations, such as the military services, intelligence
organizations, related government agencies, and their supporting defense industries
require Multi-Level Security (MLS). These systems enable the concurrent processing
of data at multiple and unique classifications. A security policy in a MLS environment
must enforce a model of access control, known as the Bell-La Padula (BLP) model, which
prevents individuals from accessing information at a classification for which they are
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not authorized. Examples of such sensitivity or security levels could be Unclassified,
Confidential, Secret, and Top-Secret.
Furthermore, the velocity and volume of available data are increasing through the
contributions of both humans and devices alike. Also the demand for big data analysis are
increasing, as businesses turn to big data analytics to create the competitive advantages
needed within the marketplace. The transformation of data into information, then
information into business intelligence costs time, money, and expertise. The end result of
this transformation is the most valuable resource for any business–knowledge. However,
the marketplace demands innovation and constant motion, stagnation causes atrophy.
As businesses share their data with partners, loose employees to competitors, and invest
heavily in new technologies, the demand for securing their data will grow. MLS is not
common within the private sector now, as many businesses rely on the Windows operating
system, which is based on discretionary access control (DAC). With DAC subjects can
create files, thus becoming the owner, and pass on permissions to any subject of their
choosing. However, as security becomes a greater concern for businesses the need to
secure data at an organizational level will grow, leading to MLS. The growing need to
keep some data or information ’confidential’ for competitive advantage, trade secrets,
abide by regulations, intellectual property, or commercial-in-confidence enforcement, is a
strong driving force pushing towards a security-centric architecture.
Numerous studies have shown that unauthorized access poses a major security threat
for distributed enterprise environments. The threat is exacerbated in a multi-domain
environment where businesses collaborate in order to meet their business objectives.
The challenge is in developing new or extending existing security models for efficient
security management and administration in multi-domain environments that allow
secure interoperation among individuals or organizations belonging to different security
domains. More specifically, operating within a multi-domain environment, where each
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domain has its own MLS policy, brings up two primary questions. First, what are the
effects on security when two domains have mapped their MLS policies incorrectly?
Second, how can both the sensitive data and the MLS policies be distributed amongst
multiple domains securely?
Organization
The remainder of the project is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the
literature review. Chapter 3 identifies several BLP security violations that arise when
two domains map their MLS policies incorrectly. Since the literature review did not
uncover the particular BLP violations related to incorrect mapping, six test scenarios
are developed to investigate the violations. Chapter 4 outlines how MLS policies are
represented within SPKI name and authorization certificates, along with demonstrating a
Prolog implementation of the logic. Chapter 5 presents the MLS Cross-Domain Security
Policies. Chapter 6 presents a solution that allows for the secure dissemination of MLS
data and concludes with a summary including contributions, findings, and shortcomings.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
Mandatory Access Control
Mandatory access control (MAC) is a method of limiting access to system resources
based on the sensitivity of the information (classification) and the authorization of the
user (clearance). In a seminal work Denning, 1976; Bell, 2005 by Denning, a lattice
structure was introduced to formally specify a Bella Padular (BLP) model (BellDavid,
2005) for a MLS system. The underlying goal is for information to flow from lower
classifications to higher classifications (Example 1), while also providing the additional
level of protection known as compartmentalization or “need to know” (Example 2).
Below, in Figure 2.1 is an example of the lattice structure. The security levels are
connected by edges, and information should flow from a lower classification to a higher
classification following the edges.
Figure 2.1: Lattice structure.
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Example 1. Based on Figure 2.1, TS : {} is a higher classification than S : {}. Therefore,
TS : {} can read from S : {} and S : {} can write to TS : {}, allowing information to flow
from a lower classification to a higher classification. However, TS : {} cannot write to S :
{} nor can S : {} read from TS : {}, as this would allow information to flow from a higher
classification to a lower classification. The implementation mechanics are discussed in
Examples 3 and 4.
Example 2. Based on Figure 2.1, TS : {} cannot read from or write to S : {bio}. Although
the Top Secret classification (TS : {}) is higher than the Secret classification (S : {bio}),
TS : {} does not have the need to know as it lacks the {bio} compartment. By creating
compartments, such as {bio}, access becomes much more granular, simply having a Top
Secret clearance will not grant a user access to everything.
To prevent information from leaking, the BLP models proposed: the simple security
property and the star property. Taken together the two properties ensure information
flows from low to high (Figure 2.2). The security policies are built around subjects (S)
and objects (O), each with a security level. A subject’s security level is referred to as a
clearance, whereas an object’s security level is referred to a classification. A subject can
access (read, write, or modify) an object given as a set of security rules.
Figure 2.2: BLP properties and information flow.
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Simple security property Also known as the “no read-up,” states that a subject at a
given security level may not read an object at a higher security level (Bell, 2005). In other
words, a subject (S) may read object (O) if the security level (sl) of the object is less than
or equal to the level of the subject.
sl(O) ≤ sl(S)
Example 3. Assuming Alice has the security clearance TS : {bio}, Alice cannot read O1
(with the classification TS : {bio,chem}), as the security classification for O1 is higher
than Alice’s clearance. However, Alice can read the object O2 (with the classification
S : {bio}), as sl(O2) ≤ sl(Alice). Furthermore, Alice could also read O3 (with the
classification S : {}).
∗ (star) property Also known as the “no write-down,” states that a subject at a given
security level may not write to any object at a lower security level. In other words, the
subject (S) may write to the object (O) if the security level (sl) of the subject is less than
or equal to the level of the object.
sl(S) ≤ sl(O)
Example 4. Assuming Alice has the security clearance TS : {bio}, Alice can write to O1
(with the classification TS : {bio,chem}), as Alice’s security clearance is lower than the
classification for O1. However, Alice cannot write to the object O2 (with the classification
S : {bio}), as the sl(Alice) is not less than or equal to sl(O2). Furthermore, Alice cannot
write to O3 (with the classification S : {}).
Whenever a subject wants to access an object these two properties are verified prior
to granting access. It is important to note that the equations are very similar, the only real
difference is whether the subject dominates the object–simple security condition–or the
object dominates the subject–star property.
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Simple Public Key Infrastructure
“In access control of shared computing resources, the authorization problem
addresses the following question: given a security policy, should a principal be allowed
access to a specific resource” (Hermanns and Palsberg, 2006)? In the Simple Public Key
Infrastructure (SPKI)1, the security policy is given by a set of signed certificates, and
proof of authorization consists of a set of certificate chains.
In SPKI, a principal can be any of the following: individual, system process, host,
or other entities. All principals are identified with their public keys. The identity of a
principal is established through the validation of the corresponding public key. K is used
to denote the set of all principals and uses K, often with subscripts or superscripts (such
as K, KA, KB, K
′, etc.), to denote a principal. An identi f ier is a word (such as A or Bob)
defined over some given standard alphabet.
The set of identifiers is denoted by A . A term is a key that is followed by zero or
more identifiers. A term can also be a local name or an extended name. A local name has
the form KA, where K ∈ K and A ∈ A, and an extended name is a principal followed
by more than one identifier. A local name has the form KA where K ∈ K and A ∈ A
(i.e. KBob, KAlice). An extended name is a key followed by more than one identifier, i.e.
K csusb ids f aculty.
SPKI has two types of certificates, or “certs”:
• Name Certificates (name certs) define the names available in an issuer’s local
namespace. Specifically, a name cert provides a definition of a local name in the
issuer’s local namespace. Only key K may issue or sign a cert that defines a name
in its local namespace. A name cert C is a signed 4-tuple (K, A, S, V ). The issuer
1an Internet Protocol Ellison et al., 1999. The current (2.0) version of SPKI is a merger of SPKI 1.0 and
the Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) 1.0.
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(principal) K is a public key and the certificate is signed by K. A is an identifier.
The subject S is a term. S gives additional meaning for the local name KA. V is the
validity specification of the certificate often taking on a time-span, i.e., the cert is
valid from date/time x to y.
• Authorization Certificates (auth certs) grant authorizations (from an issuer to a
subject), or delegate the ability to grant authorizations. An auth cert is a 5-tuple
(K, S, D, T, V ) where K, S, and V are identical to the definition provided for
name certs and play the same role. If the delegation flag D is set, then the subject
receiving the authorization can delegate the authorization to any other key. The
authorization specification T specifies the permission being granted; for example,
it may specify the permission to read or write to a file or to grant login access to a
particular host.
With SPKI, trust is decentralized; any principal may transfer a specific permission
to another principal. A principal may transfer read and write or simply just write only
privileges to a subject. Additionally, a principal may allow the subject to further transfer
those permissions–referred to as delegation.
Figure 2.3: Example of SPKI authorization certificate and delegation.
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In Figure 2.3, the first auth cert (AC1) has: the principal (K) as KAlice, the subject
(S) as KBob, the delegation flag (D) set to true and represented with an unfilled block, the
authorization specification (T ) as Read/Write O1 and the validity (V ) is omitted, meaning
unlimited validity. The second auth cert (AC2) has: the principal (K) as KBob, the subject
(S) as KKevin, the delegation flag (D) set to false and represented with a filled block, the
authorization specification (T ) as Read O1, and the validity (V ) is omitted.
Example 5. KAlice issues AC1 to KBob allowing KBob to read and write to O1 along with
the authority to delegate read and write access to O1. KBob issues AC2 to KKevin allowing
KKevin to only read O1 and does not pass on the ability to delegate; meaning KKevin cannot
transfer the permission to read O1 any further. When KKevin attempts to access O1, KKevin
must present both certificates, AC1 and AC2, as proof.
Active Bundle
Active Bundle (AB) is a mechanism used to protect the privacy of data and its user’s
identities (Othman and Lilien, 2009; Othman, 2010). An AB is a construct that bundles
together three components sensitive data, metadata, and a virtual machine (VM). The
three components are collectively called a payload of the bundle (Othman, 2010).
Sensitive data: is a digital content (i.e. bank wire transfer or patient personal data)
that needs to be protected from privacy violations, data leaks, unauthorized accesses, etc.
Metadata: contains information about data carried by the AB. The metadata includes
privacy and access control policies for sensitive data.
Virtual machine: controls and manages the program enclosed in an active bundle.
The essential task of the virtual machine is the enforcement of the privacy and other
policies specified by the metadata. It guarantees the appropriate access control for
sensitive data of the bundle. For example, it discloses to the authorized entity (called
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guardian) the proportion of sensitive data it is entitled to access. The VM also performs
integrity checks for the bundle. The VM decides whether to enable a bundle or not;
considering the trustworthiness of the host as the criterion.
The active bundle scheme protects sensitive data as long as they are accessed
through an active bundle. Active bundle offers protection mechanisms (such as the
implementation of disclosure rules, evaporation, and apoptosis).
The creator of an active bundle provides data to a bundle disseminator (middleware)
that automatically generates metadata for the bundle. The creator uses a pseudo-random
number generator PRNG to generate a random number N. Next, the creator calculates
the hash H(N) of N and sends H(N) and PRNG to a secure server. The server generates
the hash value K = H(S, PRNG, H(N)), and encryption Es(PRNG), where S is the
server’s private key. Then, the security server returns K and Es(PRNG) to the creator.
The creator uses the key K as the encryption key, and an encryption algorithm EA (e.g.,
AES 128) to encrypt sensitive data and metadata. In addition, the creator loads the
following information into the active bundle: EA, ES(PRNG), and VM. Only ES(P) is
encrypted. EA is not encrypted since it is a public encryption algorithm. The VM is also
not encrypted. Once the bundle is created and passed to an owner, the owner decides if
the bundle should be publicly available or not. If so, the owner registers it in an active
bundle directory. The bundle is now ready for dissemination to one or more hosts.
Bundle exchange is realized by using guardian buddies to transfer active bundles
between guardians or to a destination. The source guardian (which could be the owner
if it is the very first dissemination) forwards the active bundle to Buddy B1, B1 sends the
bundle to Buddy B2, and B2 forwards the bundle to the destination host. Note that B1 and
B2 are selected based on their trustworthiness.
Once the destination host receives an active bundle, it can enable or store the AB.
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The host can then active bundle at any time. A prerequisite for enabling an active bundle,
through its VM, is obtaining the necessary decryption key. The VM requests it from the
security server. First, the VM sends Es(PRNG) (included in the bundle’s metadata) to the
security server. The server decrypts Es(PRNG) using its private key S. Using PRNG, the
server generates a random numberM, and then the hash value K = H(S, PRNG, H(M)).
Finally, the server sends K to the VM of the active bundle.
Active bundles have been used to protect patients’ electronic medical records (Salih,
Lilien, and Othman, 2012). Active bundles are used to protect sensitive data outsourced to
a cloud throughout their entire life-cycle both in the cloud as well as outside of the cloud
(Sarhan and Carr, 2017). Implementation of an active bundle within a MLS environment
would require a secured operating system such as Security-Enhanced Linux. Although
physical implementation is outside the scope of this project, it is worth mentioning that
Security-Enhanced Linux does support MLS.
Access Control Models in Multi-Domain Environments
Most of the research done on access and authorization control, for resource sharing
within a multi-domain collaborative environments, have focused on frameworks based
on Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) models (Crampton, 2002; Shehab, Bertino, and
Ghafoor, 2005; Shafiq, 2006; Kim, Kim, Ryu, and Kim, 2009; Gouglidis, Mavridis, and
Hu, 2013; Hilia, Chibani, Winter, and Djouani, 2017). One of the most referenced works
on inter-operation and access control management, specifically for MLS multi-domain
environments, was done by Dawson, Qian, and Samarati. They proposed three formal
properties for correctly specifying the mapping between security levels of multiple
domains with different security level lattices. The three properties proposed are
consistency, non-ambiguity, and nonredundancy properties (Dawson, Qian, and Samarati,
2000). The consistency property states that the dominance relationship li ≥ l j formed by a
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security mapping (≥) should not affect the original and local dominance relationship li ≥x
l j in the individual domain Dx:
Consistency Property For all lattices Lx = 〈Lx ,≥x〉 , and levels li, l j ∈ Lx : li ≥
l j =⇒ li≥xl j.
Note that the consistency property is the only constraint for ensuring that no
unauthorized information flow will occur. Although ambiguity and redundancy in
cross-lattice relationships do not cause any improper information flow, they would
introduce unnecessary compilations and obscure translation. For this reason, the
authors proposed two additional requirements, namely, nonambiguity property and
nonredundancy property.
For the correctness of the security-level mapping, it is required that cross-lattice
relationships must not be ambiguous. The nonambiguity property states that a security
level l j dominated by a security level li in the trusting domain cannot map to a security
level that dominates a level to which li maps. Formally, it can be expressed as:
Nonambiguity Property For any trusting domain DA and trusted domain DS,
and levels li, l j ∈ LA, lu, lv ∈ LS : (li ≥A l j) ∧ (lu ≥S lv) ∧ (li ≥ lv) ∈ MapA =⇒ (l j ≥
lu) /∈MapA.
The last property proposed is called the nonredundancy property. The
nonredundancy property has two conditions that must be satisfied:
Nonredundancy Property
(i) For all li, l j ∈ LA, lu ∈ LS : (li ≥A l j)∧ (li ≥ lu) ∈MapA =⇒ (l j ≥ lu) /∈MapA.
(ii) For all li ∈ LA, lu, lv ∈ LS : (lu ≥S lv)∧ (li ≥ lu) ∈MapA =⇒ (li ≥ lv) /∈MapA.
Although the authors formally define the important properties, which can be used
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as requirements for specifying the correct cross-lattice relationships between different
domains, they did not discuss the effect on the domains. Specifically, the BLP violations
related to the incorrect mapping. There appears to be no literature that addresses the BLP
violations related to incorrect mapping. Therefore, Chapter 3 includes an investigation
into information leakage within cross-lattice relationships along with the role trust plays
when security levels are incorrectly mapped.
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CHAPTER 3
MLS VIOLATIONS IN MULTI-DOMAIN ENVIRONMENTS
This chapter identifies several BLP security violations that arise when two domains
map their MLS policies incorrectly between one another. Since the issues related to
incorrect mapping have not been explored in regards to BLP violations, six test scenarios
(Figure 3.1) are developed using a combination of the direction of trust (one-way,
two-way) and their type of trust (partial read, partial write, and full read and write).
Figure 3.1: Test Scenario Matrix.
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Test scenarios
The following six test scenarios are built around two domains D1 and D2 (Figure
3.2), each with its own MLS structure. For simplicity, a lattice structure that does not
include compartments is adopted. The correct security mapping would map D1 High to
D2 Top Secret and D1 Low to D2 Unclassi f ied.
Figure 3.2: The two domains used for the six test scenarios.
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Test Scenario 1 (one-way full trust)
The following test scenario depicts an incorrect mapping where D1 High maps
to D2 Unclassi f ied and D1 Low maps to D2 Top Secret (Figure 3.3). Because of this
one-way full trust mapping:
• D2 Unclassi f ied can read from D1 High
• D2 Unclassi f ied can write to D1 High
• D2 Top Secret can read from D1 Low
• D2 Top Secret can write to D1 Low
Figure 3.3: One-way full trust with incorrect mapping.
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Star property violation The Star Property is violated (write down) in D2 because the
information is able to flow from D2 Top Secret to D2 Unclassi f ied (Figure 3.4).
D2 Top Secret writes to D1 Low (3.1)
D1 Low writes to D1 High (3.2)
D2 Unclassi f ied reads f rom D1 High (3.3)
Simple security condition violation The simple security condition is violated (read up)
in D1 because the information is able to flow from D1 High to D1 Low (Figure 3.5).
D2 Unclassi f ied reads f rom D1 High (3.1)
D2 Unclassi f ied writes to D2 Secret (3.2)
D2 Secret writes to D2 Top Secret (3.3)
D2 Top Secret writes to D1 Low (3.4)
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Figure 3.4: Start property violation.
Figure 3.5: Simple security condition violation.
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Test scenario 2 (two-way full trust)
The following test scenario depicts an incorrect mapping where D1 High maps
to D2 Unclassi f ied and D1 Low maps to D2 Top Secret (Figure 3.6). Because of this
two-way full trust mapping:
• D2 Unclassi f ied can read from D1 High
• D2 Unclassi f ied can write to D1 High
• D1 High can read from D2 Unclassi f ied
• D1 High can write to D2 Unclassi f ied
• D2 Top Secret can read from D1 Low
• D2 Top Secret can write to D1 Low
• D1 Low can read from D2 Top Secret
• D1 Low can write to D2 Top Secret
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Figure 3.6: Two-way full trust with incorrect mapping.
Violations Test scenario 1 ⊆ Test scenario 2, therefore, the same two violations
that exist in Test scenario 1 exist in Test scenario 2. Moreover, Test scenario 2 will
also contain the inverse violations, resulting in both simple security and star property
violations in both D1 and D2.
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Test scenario 3 (one-way partial trust to read)
The following test scenario depicts an incorrect mapping where D1 High maps to
D2 Unclassi f ied (Figure 3.7). The mapping of D1 Low to D2 Top Secret is of no concern
as D2 Top Secret reading D1 Low is valid. Because of this one-way partial trust to read
mapping:
• D2 Unclassi f ied can read from D1 High
• D2 Top Secret can read from D1 Low
Figure 3.7: One-way full partial trust to read with incorrect mapping.
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Simple security condition violation The MLS policies in D1 are not violated in
D1, nor are the MLS policies of D2 violated within D2. However, the MLS policies of
D1 are not upheld by D2. The simple security condition is violated (read up) as both
D2 Unclassi f ied and D2 Secret are able to read D1 High (Figure 3.8).
D2 Unclassi f ied reads f rom D1 High (3.1)
D2 Unclassi f ied writes to D1 Secret (3.2)
Figure 3.8: Simple security condition violation.
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Test scenario 4 (one-way partial trust to write)
The following test scenario depicts an incorrect mapping where D1 Low maps
to D2 Top Secret (Figure 3.7). The mapping of D1 High to D2 Unclassi f ied is of no
concern, as D2 Unclassi f ied writing to D1 High is valid. Because of this one-way partial
trust to read mapping:
• D2 Unclassi f ied can write to D1 High
• D2 Top Secret can write to D1 Low
Figure 3.9: One-way full partial trust to write with incorrect mapping.
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Star property violation The MLS policies in D1 are not violated in D1, nor are the
MLS policies of D2 violated within D2. However, the MLS policies of D2 are not upheld
by D1. The star property is violated (write down) as D2 Top Secret is able to write to
D1 Low (Figure 3.10).
D2 Top Secret writes to D1 Low (3.1)
Figure 3.10: Star property violation.
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Test scenario 5 (two-way partial trust to read)
The following test scenario depicts an incorrect mapping where D1 High maps to
D2 Unclassi f ied, and D1 Low maps to D2 Top Secret (Figure 3.11). Because of this
two-way partial trust to read mapping:
• D2 Unclassi f ied can read from D1 High
• D1 High can read from D2 Unclassi f ied
• D2 Top Secret can read from D1 Low
• D1 Low can read from D2 Top Secret
Figure 3.11: Two-way partial trust to read with incorrect mapping.
Violations Test scenario 3⊆ Test scenario 5, therefore, the same violations that exist in
Test scenario 3 exist in Test scenario 5.
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Simple security condition violation The simple security condition is violated (read up)
in D1 because the information is able to flow from D1 High to D1 Low (Figure 3.12).
D2 Unclassi f ied reads f rom D1 High (3.1)
D2 Secret reads f rom D2 Unclassi f ied (3.2)
D2 Top Secret reads f rom D2 Secret (3.3)
D1 Low reads f rom D2 Top Secret (3.4)
Simple security condition violation The simple security condition is violated (read
up) in D2 because the information is able to flow from D2 Top Secret to D2 Secret and
D2 Unclassi f ied (Figure 3.13).
D1 Low reads f rom D2 Top Secret (3.1)
D1 High reads f rom D1 Low (3.2)
D2 Unclassi f ied reads f rom D1 High (3.3)
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Figure 3.12: Simple security condition violation.
Figure 3.13: Simple security condition violation.
27
Test scenario 6 (two-way partial trust to write)
The following test scenario depicts an incorrect mapping where D1 High maps to
D2 Unclassi f ied, and D1 Low maps to D2 Top Secret (Figure 3.14). Because of this
two-way partial trust to write mapping:
• D2 Unclassi f ied can write to D1 High
• D1 High can write to D2 Unclassi f ied
• D2 Top Secret can write to D1 Low
• D1 Low can write to D2 Top Secret
Figure 3.14: Two-way partial trust to write with incorrect mapping.
Violations Test scenario 4⊆ Test scenario 6, therefore, the same violations that exist in
Test scenario 4 exist in Test scenario 6.
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Star property violation The star property is violated (write down) in D1 because the
information is able to flow from D1 High to D1 Low (Figure 3.15).
D1 High writes to D2 Unclassi f ied (3.1)
D2 Unclassi f ied writes to D2 Secret (3.2)
D2 Secret writes to D1 Top Secret (3.3)
D2 Top Secret writes to D1 Low (3.4)
Star property violation The star property is violated (write down) in D2 because the
information is able to flow from D2 Top Secret to D2 Secret and D2 Unclassi f ied (Figure
3.16).
D2 Top Secret writes to D1 Low (3.1)
D1 Low writes to D1 High (3.2)
D1 High writes to D2 Unclassi f ied (3.3)
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Figure 3.15: Simple security condition violation.
Figure 3.16: Simple security condition violation.
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Violations Matrix
Test Scenario D1 Violation D2 Violation
MLS Policy
not Upheld
(1) One-way
Full Trust
Simple Security Start Property
Trustor (D1)
Trustee (D2)
(2) Two-way
Full Trust
Simple Security
Start Property
Simple Security
Start Property
Trustor (D1)
Trustee (D2)
(3) One-way
Partial Trust to Read
Trustor (D1)
(4) One-way
Partial Trust to Write
Trustee (D2)
(5) Two-way
Partial Trust to Read
Simple Security Simple Security
Trustor (D1)
Trustee (D2)
(6) Two-way
Partial Trust to Write
Start Property Start Property
Trustor (D1)
Trustee (D2)
Table 3.1: Violations matrix
The direction of the trust provides minimal security benefit to either domain. The
only test scenario that provides any protection to the trustor is test scenario 4, where the
trustor gives the trustee write-only privileges. Furthermore, the only protection to the
trustee is in test Scenario 3, where the trustor gives the trustee read-only privileges. When
two domains create a trust relationship, the direction of trust and the type of trust does
not provide protection for both parties. The incorrect mapping between the domains can
cause issues for both domains. At best, one of the domains will have their MLS policy
violated.
The six test scenarios are not exhaustive. However, the scenarios highlight the
need for domains to understand the MLS policies of any domain they interact with and
trust. Lacking understanding of the MLS policies of trusted domains can lead to various
violations resulting in information leakage.
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CHAPTER 4
BLP MODEL IN SPKI
Logical Representation of BLP in SPKI
There are two ways to implement the lattice in Figure 2.1 (reproduced here as
Figure 4.1 for reader clarity). The first approach consists of a central MLS authority
in a domain responsible for labeling all the objects and subjects. The second approach
consists of a hierarchy of MLS authorities at each security level. The first approach is
used in this project.
Figure 4.1: Lattice structure
In a local domain d, Kd is a domain controller and KMLS d is a sub-controller or
security entity responsible for assigning the security levels or labels to the subjects
and objects in domain d. For example, Alice and the object O1 are labeled as having
TS : {bio, chem} and S : {}, respectively. This can be expressed by SPKI name cert as:
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Kd MLS Policy −→ KMLS d (4.1)
KMLS d TS : {bio,chem} −→ KAlice (4.2)
KMLS d S : {} −→ KO1 (4.3)
Both the simple and star property can be modeled in SPKI authorization certificates.
For example, the simple property of the highlighted area of the MLS lattice shown in
Figure 4.1 can be expressed as:
KMLS d  −−−−−−−→
read OS:{}
KMLS d S : {}  (4.1)
KMLS d  −−−−−−−→
read OS:{}
KMLS d S : {bio}  (4.2)
KMLS d  −−−−−−−→
read OS:{}
KMLS d TS : {bio}  (4.3)
KMLS d  −−−−−−−→
read OS:{}
KMLS d TS : {bio}  (4.4)
KMLS d  −−−−−−−→
read OS:{}
KMLS d TS : {bio, chem}  (4.5)
KMLS d  −−−−−−−−−→
read OS:{bio}
KMLS d S : {bio}  (4.6)
KMLS d  −−−−−−−−−→
read OS:{bio}
KMLS d TS : {bio}  (4.7)
KMLS d  −−−−−−−−−→
read OS:{bio}
KMLS d TS : {bio, chem}  (4.8)
KMLS d  −−−−−−−−−→
read OTS:{bio}
KMLS d TS : {bio}  (4.9)
KMLS d  −−−−−−−−−→
read OTS:{bio}
KMLS d TS : {bio, chem}  (4.10)
KMLS d  −−−−−−−−−−−−→
read OTS:{bio,chem}
KMLS d TS : {bio, chem}  (4.11)
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If Alice (with TS : {bio} security clearance) sends a read request to an object
OS:{} (whose security classification level is S : {}), she has to provide the following
certifications to the MLS domain controller KMLS d :
KMLS d  −−−−−−−→
read OS:{}
KMLS d TS : {bio}  (4.1)
KMLS d TS : {bio} −→ KAlice (4.2)
The reference monitor or guard goes through the following verification process:
KMLS d  −−−−−−−→
read OS:{}
KMLS d TS : {bio} −→ KAlice
Prolog Implementation
In order to test the mechanics of embedding MLS policies within SPKI, the Prolog
program in Appendix C was developed to demonstrate both restricted and unrestricted
dissemination. The program implements the relationships between domains found in
Figure 4.2. In Figure 4.2 the solid black line represents unrestricted dissemination, the
solid red line represents restricted dissemination, while the dashed black line represents
unrestricted dissemination with an upstream restricted dissemination relationship.
Program Overview
The program first describes each object within the AB (O1, O2, and O3) along with
their respective security levels (Low, Medium, High) in lines 2 through 4. Following
the declaration of the objects, lines 6 through 17 identify the various subjects, their
security levels, and the domain that issued the certificate. Next, lines 20 through 33
define the authorization policy for the AB. Following the authorization policy is the
trust policy in lines 35 through 48. Note that lines 35 and 36 represent a restrictive
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dissemination certificate, where the certificate is only valid if the issuer is the Army. Lines
48 through 52 represent the recursive certificates, with line 48 handling the certificates
with restrictive dissemination. Finally, lines 54 through 58 verify the certificate chain.
The remaining lines are simply there to make the program more user-friendly by allowing
the user to list the authorization policy, subjects, objects, and trust certificates.
Figure 4.2: Prolog Example: Domain Trust
Program Examples
Example 6. The following is an actual output of the Prolog terminal. The terminal shows
the access KAlice has, with respect to the objects (O1, O2, and O3). Prolog was asked
to display the access Alice has, and according to the program, Alice can read all three
objects but only write to O3.
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Figure 4.3: Prolog Example: Terminal output
Example 7. The following is an example output and shows that KKevin from the Air
Force Domain has the same privileges as KAlice and the certificate chain is Unrestricted
Dissemination. Note, that this is not an exact output, as the actual output would repeat
the Unrestricted Dissemination line several times as it goes through the recursive process,
it has been omitted and will be omitted in the following examples for simplicity.
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?- accessGrant(”K Kevin”, read, ”K AB o1”).
Unrestricted Dissemination
true
?- accessGrant(”K Kevin”, read, ”K AB o2”).
Unrestricted Dissemination
true
?- accessGrant(”K Kevin”, read, ”K AB o3”).
Unrestricted Dissemination
true
?- accessGrant(”K Kevin”, write, ”K AB o3”).
Unrestricted Dissemination
true
?- accessGrant(”K Kevin”, write, ”K AB o2”).
Unrestricted Dissemination
false
?- accessGrant(”K Kevin”, write, ”K AB o1”).
Unrestricted Dissemination
false
Example 8. The following is an example output below and shows that KBob can read O2
and O1. In addition, KBob can write to O2 and O3. Also, note that the certificate chain is
now Restricted Dissemination.
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?- accessGrant(”K Bob”, read, ”K AB o1”).
Restricted Dissemination
true
?- accessGrant(”K Bob”, read, ”K AB o2”).
Restricted Dissemination
true
?- accessGrant(”K Bob”, read, ”K AB o3”).
Restricted Dissemination
false
?- accessGrant(”K Bob”, write, ”K AB o3”).
Restricted Dissemination
true
?- accessGrant(”K Bob”, write, ”K AB o2”).
Restricted Dissemination
true
?- accessGrant(”K Bob”, write, ”K AB o1”).
Restricted Dissemination
false
Example 9. The following is an example output below and shows that KRob cannot read
or write to any object, despite the fact that KRob has a trust certificate from the Army, due
to a restricted dissemination certificate in the chain.
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?- accessGrant(”K Rob”, read, ”K AB o1”).
Restricted Dissemination
false
?- accessGrant(”K Rob”, read, ”K AB o2”).
Restricted Dissemination
false
?- accessGrant(”K Rob”, read, ”K AB o3”).
Restricted Dissemination
false
?- accessGrant(”K Rob”, write, ”K AB o3”).
Restricted Dissemination
false
?- accessGrant(”K Rob”, write, ”K AB o2”).
Restricted Dissemination
false
?- accessGrant(”K Rob”, write, ”K AB o1”).
Restricted Dissemination
false
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CHAPTER 5
MLS CROSS-DOMAIN SECURITY LEVEL MAPPING
In a MLS distributed environment, if one domain (trusting domain) Di trusts another
domain (trusted domain) D j, both domains can build a cross-lattice relationship. The
cross-relationship specifies which security levels of the trusting domain dominates (or
is mapped to) which security levels of the trusted domain. This security level mapping
between two domains is denoted as li ≥ l j, where li ∈ Li, l j ∈ L j. Specifically, ≥ is used
to represent the following:
• A dominance relationship holding in an individual lattice ≥x can be replaced.
• A cross-dominance or cross-lattice relationship from the trusting domain Di to the
trusted domain D j, namely, li ≥ l j, where li ∈ Li and l j ∈ L j.
• A combination of the cross-lattice and (individual) lattice relationship.
A security level mapping li ≥ l j can be implemented by the following SPKI name
certificate: li −→ l j. This certificate issued by Di states that security level li of domain Di
is mapped to the security level l j of D j (in SPKI terms, the security level li is redefined
as another security level l j). In this project, both notations are used interchangeably.
Note that security level mapping in a cross-lattice relationship are unidirectional from
the trusting domain to the trusted domain.
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Example 10. Assume that there are two domains, the AB (5.1) and the Army domain (5.2)
and the AB trusts the Army. The AB domain has three security levels: TS : {bio}, TS : {},
and Secret : {} (5.3). The Army has the following security labels: TS : {}, Secret : {},
and Classi f ied : {} (5.4). If the security level KMLS AB TS : {bio} of the AB dominates
the security level KMLS Army TS{} of the Army domain, we can express the cross-domain
dominance relationship ((5.5)).
DAB (5.1)
DArmy (5.2)
LAB = {KMLS AB TS : {bio}, KMLS AB TS : {}, KMLS AB Secret : {}} (5.3)
LArmy = {KMLS Army TS, KMLS Army Secret : {}, KMLS Army Classi f ied : {}} (5.4)
KMLS AB TS : {bio} ≥ KMLS Army TS{} (5.5)
This cross lattice relationship can be realized by the following name certificate:
KMLS AB TS : {bio} −→ KMLS Army TS
The above name certificate clearly shows that there is a cross security level mapping from
security level TS : bio of the active bundle (trusting domain) to the security level TS of the
Army domain (trusted domain).
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CHAPTER 6
MLS DATA DISSEMINATION
MLS Data Dissemination Strategy
Normally, the data disseminator (sender) must know the recipients prior to sending
any data; furthermore, the sender must be aware of the recipient’s security clearance prior
to distribution. Knowledge of all recipients and their respective clearances is not always
practical or even possible. By leveraging AB, SPKI, and a directory server, data can
be disseminated prior to the identification of all recipients and their respective security
clearances.
The sensitive data within the AB is secured through encryption. Once the AB
is enabled, it’s protected and controlled by the VM. The authorization policy and
trust policy are defined within the metadata of the AB. The policies limit access to
trusted entities. The AB signs both policies via SPKI, thus producing the authorization
certificates and name certificates that are stored in the metadata unencrypted. Through
Evaporation (partial self-destruction) and Apoptosis (full self-destruction), the AB
can protect the sensitive data, allowing for the distribution of data without the fear of
information leaking.
There are two main ways a domain can learn about the authorization and trust
policies of an AB. The first way is to directly read both SPKI authorization certificates
and name certificates from the metadata of an AB when it arrives at the domain for
execution. Another way is through a reliable directory service. An AB publishes its
SPKI authorization and name certificates to a directory server, thus allowing a third
party to query the directory server in order to understand the authorization and trust
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policies necessary to access a particular AB. The directory server acts as a global catalog
allowing AB creators and consumers a secure pathway to distribute MLS data. Although
the information within the directory server is public, restricting access and monitoring
requests to and from the directory server would provide additional security. However, the
mechanism of providing a reliable and secure directory service is beyond the scope of this
project.
SPKI provides the mechanism by which the authorization and trust policies are
defined and trusted, as each request made to the AB must be proven through a certificate
chain. Additionally, SPKI allows for a distributed trust network, accomplished by issuing
name certificates that represent trust. Therefore, the requester is not required to have a
direct trust relationship with the AB; instead, trust can be transitive, if allowed by the AB.
MLS Data Dissemination Methods
There are two primary dissemination scenarios that must be supported, unrestricted
dissemination and restricted dissemination. When a domain (A) creates a trust
relationship with another domain (B), domain A must decide if domain B will be
permitted delegation rights to extend the trust in a transitive manner. If domain B is
permitted to delegate the trust to another domain (C), it is referred to as unrestricted
dissemination. However, if domain B was disallowed from extending the trust to domain
C it would be referred to as restricted dissemination.
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Figure 6.1: Dissemination scenario (Domain D is not trusted by Domain A).
Example 11. In Figure 6.1, domain A provides domain B unrestricted dissemination
rights, thereby allowing domain B the ability to further extend the trust relationship.
As such, domain B issues unrestricted dissemination rights to domain X and restricted
dissemination rights to domain C. The right to extend the trust can be limited anywhere
down the line, in this example domain C cannot extend the trust any further. Although
domain C has a trust relationship with domain D, domain D will not be trusted by domain
A, whereas domain X would be allowed to extend.
A more specific example can be seen in Figure 6.2. The AB provides domain
B unrestricted dissemination rights, thereby allowing domain B the ability to further
extend the trust relationship. More specifically, as the security level High and Low of the
AB trusts the security level b1 and b3 of domain B, respectively, it forms cross-lattice
relationships High ≥ b1 and Low ≥ b3 and issues the following name certificates to map
High to b1 and Low to b3:
KMLS AB High −→ KMLS B b1
KMLS AB Low −→ KMLS B b3
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Domain C
Domain M
Domain B
Active Bundle Construct
No futher delegation
No futher delegation
High
Low
Medium
b1
b4
b3b2
c1
c2
c3
m1
m2
m3
unrestricted dissemination
restricted dissemination
restricted dissemination
(Name Cert)
(Name Cert with restriction)
(Name cert with restriction)
Figure 6.2: MLS Trust relationships (mappings)
Domain B has to decide whether it will delegate the authorization rights, from
domain A, to domain M (unrestricted dissemination) or not (restricted dissemination).
In the scenario shown in Figure 6.2, domain B decides to issue restricted dissemination
to domain M. Thus, domain M cannot delegate the trust further to another domains. To
indicate the restricted dissemination, a simple synthetic sugar (modification) to the SPKI
name certificate is required. For example, domain B issues the following name certificates
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to map b1 to m1 and b4 to m3:
KMLS B b1 −→ KMLS M m1, KMLS M m1−→ KM m1 (6.1)
KMLS B b4 −→ KMLS M m3, KMLS M m3−→ KM m3 (6.2)
As shown in the above equations (6.1) and (6.2), the synthetic sugar is added to the name
certificates issued and signed by KMLS B b1 and KMLS B b4. For example, the restriction
KMLS M m1 −→ KM m1 requires that the security level m1 of domain M must be assigned
to an individual entity (public key) which belongs to the security group KMLS M m1. This
restriction has the following implications:
• KMLS M m1 cannot be mapped to the security levels of other domains and must be
reduced to a public key or entity eligible for the security level KMLS M m1
• The restricted name certificate signals to the domains wanting to access to an
object in the AB that it should contact other trusted domains to build a trust (or
cross-lattice) relationship.
• To shorten the restricted name certificate, the superscript ∗ is added at the end of he
mapped security level–eliminate the extra name (reduction). For example, the above
equations (6.1) and (6.2) can be shortened as below.
KMLS B b1 −→ KMLS M m1
∗ (6.3)
KMLS B b4 −→ KMLS M m3
∗ (6.4)
Note that the security level labeled with ∗ always shows up last in the name
certificate chain.
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MLS Data Dissemination Policy Specification
Definition 1. The security level mapping GSMap is a directed acyclic graph (V,E) where
the vertex v ∈ V represents a security level of a domain and the edge e = (li, l j) denotes a
dominance relationship li ≥ l j or a security level mapping li −→ l j between two different
security levels. Note that li and l j are the security levels of two different domains, namely,
li ∈ Li and l j ∈ L j. A path in GSMap from vertex l1 to vertex ln is a sequence of edges such
that the start vertex of the first edge is l1 ∈ L1, the end vertex of the last edge is ln ∈ Ln
and the start vertex of the (i+1)st edge is the same as the end vertex of the i th edge. This
path is denoted as: p(l1, ln) = l1 7→ l2 7→ · · · 7→ ln.
To specify the MLS data dissemination policy, the following predicates are needed:
• path(l1, ln,Dx) ≡ true if there exists a path p(l1, ln) in GSMap. This means that
GSMap has the following path: l1 7→ · · · 7→ ln, where l1 ∈ LAB and ln ∈ Lx. Note
that the path always starts at the active bundle domain, l1 ∈ LAB.
• certi f icateChain(l1, ln,Dx) ≡ ∃l1 ∈ LAB, ln ∈ Lx.path(l1, ln,Dx)
• dominate(l1, l2,Dx) ≡ true if l1≥x l2, where l1, l2 ∈ Lx.
• mlsAuthAB(li, l j,op) ≡ true if (dominate(li, l j,DAB) ∧ op = read) or
(dominate(l j, li,DAB) ∧ op = write).
• To grant access to the object in DAB, there must exist a security label l of DAB
which eventually maps to the security level slx(s) of the subject s in Dx and the
same security level l must satisfy the dominance requirement of DAB:
accessGrantAB(s,Dx,ob,op)≡
∃l ∈ LAB.(certi f icateChain(l,slx(s))∧mlsAuthAB(l,slAB(ob),op)),
where ob ∈ ResourceAB
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Example 12. As shown in Figure 6.2, there are cross-lattice relationships from the AB to
domain M. For example, Low ≥ b3 and b4 ≥ m3. With the internal lattice relationship b3
≥ b4, we have Low ≥ m3. The following name certificates are issued by the AB, domain
B:
KMLS AB Low −→ KMLS B b3 (6.5)
KMLS B b3 −→ KMLS B b4 (6.6)
KMLS B b4 −→ KMLS M m3∗ (6.7)
Note that the name certificate (6.6) is issued by domain B to represent the inter-lattice
relationship and publicly available. The third name certificate (6.7) for restricted
dissemination requires that domain M, more specifically, KMLS M m3 is not allowed for
further delegation and is able to issue the name certificate to an individual entity (public
key) which belongs to the security group KMLS M m3.
Assume that Mike’s security clearance level is KMLS m3 and his public key is
KM m3 Mike and he wants to access an object KMLS AB Low o2 in the AB. Then he should
provide the above three name certificates and KMLS M m3 −→ KM m3 Mike. Then this
forms the following certificate chain, which can satisfy the certi f icateChain predicate:
KMLS AB Low −→ KMLS B b3−→ KMLS B b4−→ KMLS M m3∗
With the last name certificate, KMLS M m3 −→ KM m3 Mike, we have:
KMLS AB Low −→ KMLS B b3−→ KMLS B b4−→ KMLS M m3∗ −→ KM m3 Mike
Finally, there exists a security level KMLS AB Low in the above chain that dominates
48
the security level KMLS AB Low of the object, it satisfies the mlsAuthAB predicates. Thus
the access is granted (accessGrantAB predicate becomes true) by the active bundle.
MLS Data Dissemination Example
Unrestricted MLS Data Dissemination Example
In the following example, the AB trusts the Army and anyone the Army trusts;
therefore, the Army has unrestricted dissemination rights. Meaning the Army can issue
certificates to other domains, thus extending the trust.
The AB stores both its authorization policy (SPKI authorization certificates) and trust
policy (SPKI name certificates) within its metadata. For this example, the AB (KMLS AB)
has two data objects (O1 and O2), each with its own security label (High and Low)
respectively. The authorization policy below states: High can read O1 and Low can read
O2 respectively.
KMLS AB  −−−−−−→
read O1
KMLS AB High  (6.1)
KMLS AB  −−−−−−→
read O2
KMLS AB Low  (6.2)
The trust policy below states: AB High trusts Army TopSecret : {bio} and AB Low trusts
Army Secret : {} respectively.
KMLS AB High −→ KMLS ARMY TopSecret : {bio} (6.1)
KMLS AB Low −→ KMLS ARMY Secret : {} (6.2)
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Example 13. The AB creator determines the data objects contained within the AB along
with assigning the classification (security label) of each data object (Figure 6.3 step
1). The AB creator then develops the authorization policy, establishing the privileges
to each data object (Figure 6.3 step 2). Next, the AB creator develops the trust policy,
determining the entities the AB will directly trust (Figure 6.3 step 3). Finally, all
certificates (authorization certificates and name certificates) are written to the directory
server (Figure 6.3 step 4).
Figure 6.3: Example of creating an AB containing MLS data and policies.
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In this example, Alice (KAlice) from the Air Force wants to access O1 within the AB
(KMLS AB). The Air Force does not have a direct trust relationship with the AB. Therefore,
the Air Force can learn about the authorization and trust policies directly from the AB or
by sending a query to the directory server.
Example 14. The AB arrives at the Air Force domain and is enabled by the Air Force
(Figure 6.4 step 1). At this point, the Air Force can learn about the AB directly through
the AB or from the directory server (Figure 6.4 step 2). The Air Force determines the
Army has the appropriate level of trust and authorization required to access O1 of the
AB. Furthermore, the Air Force downloads a copy of the name certificate issued by the AB
to the Army (this certificate will be required as proof when making the request for access
in step 6). The Air Force issues a request to the Army for a name certificate showing trust
between the Army and the Air Force (Figure 6.4 step 3). The Army trusts the Air Force;
therefore, a name certificate is issued to the Air Force (Figure 6.4 step 4) and sent to the
directory server (Figure 6.4 step 5). Alice makes the request to the AB and provides the
certificate chain that proves trust (Figure 6.4 step 6). The AB verifies the name certificate
chain, in order to validate the trust (Figure 6.4 step 7). Once trust is verified the AB then
consults its Authorization policy to determine if Alice is authorized to read O1 (Figure 6.4
step 8). Finally, the AB allows Alice to read O1 (Figure 6.4 step 9).
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Figure 6.4: Example of AB activation with unrestricted dissemination.
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Restricted MLS Data Dissemination Example
In the following example, the AB trusts the Army, however, the AB wants to limit
the trust to only the Army. Meaning the Army can only issue certificates within its
domain to its own subjects. The Army must not issue certificates to subjects outside the
Army’s domain.
Once again, the AB (KMLS AB) has two data objects (O1 and O2), each with its own
security label (High and Low) respectively. The authorization policy below states: High
can read O1 and Low can read O2 respectively.
KMLS AB  −−−−−−→
read O1
KMLS AB High  (6.1)
KMLS AB  −−−−−−→
read O2
KMLS AB Low  (6.2)
The following trust policy includes two certificates. The first certificate below states: AB
High trusts Army TopSecret : {bio}, however, the AB wants to limit the trust to only the
Army. Essentially line two below is stating that KMLS ARMY TopSecret : {bio} can only be
mapped to subjects within the Army domain. If a certificate chain is sent to the AB and
signed by another domain other than the Army it will be invalid.
KMLS AB High −→ KMLS ARMY TopSecret : {bio} (6.1)
KMLS ARMY TopSecret : {bio} −→ KARMYTopSecret:{bio} (6.2)
The second certificate states AB Low trusts Army Secret : {}, and again the AB
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wants to limit the trust to only the Army.
KMLS AB Low −→ KMLS ARMY Secret : {} (6.1)
KMLS ARMY Secret : {} −→ KARMYSecret:{} (6.2)
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Example 15. The AB creation process is similar to the process for unrestricted
dissemination, except the trust policy contains the restriction highlighted in red
(Figure 6.5 step 3).
Figure 6.5: Example of creating an AB containing MLS data and policies.
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In this example, Bob from the Army (KBob) wants to access O1 within the AB
(KMLS AB). Bob is a subject within the Army domain and has been issued a certificate
from the Army domain, allowing Bob access to TopSecret : {bio}.
Example 16. The AB arrives at the Army domain and is enabled by the Army (Figure 6.6
step 1). At this point, Bob (KBob) can learn about the AB directly through the AB or from
the directory server (Figure 6.6 step 2). Bob makes the request to the AB to read O1 and
provides the certificate chain that proves trust (Figure 6.6 step 3). The AB verifies the
name certificate chain, in order to validate the trust (Figure 6.6 step 4). Once trust is
verified the AB then consults its authorization policy to determine if Bob is authorized
to read O1 (Figure 6.6 step 5). Finally, the AB allows Bob to read O1 (Figure 6.6 step 6).
Figure 6.6: Example of AB activation with restricted dissemination.
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Verifying Name Certificate Chains
In Example 16, the Army user Bob was able to read O1 as Bob certificate chain was
verified. In the below certificate chain (Figure 6.7) it’s clear to see that Bob is trusted by
KMLS ARMY TopSecret : {bio}, Furthermore, the second certificate would be signed by
the Army domain, thus meeting the restriction from certificate 1. However, in Figure 6.8
Alice is issued a certificate from the Air Force domain, thus it is signed by the Air Force
and does not satisfy the restriction placed in the first certificate.
Figure 6.7: Valid certificate chain.
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Figure 6.8: Invalid certificate chain.
Each domain is trusted to issues certificates to subjects within their own domains
only. Cross-domain certificates should only be issued between domains in order to
demonstrate a trust relationship between the two domains. Therefore, domain A should
issue certificates to subjects of domain A but not to subjects of domain B. Domain
A should issue a certificate to domain B showing the trust between the two domains.
However, if domain A issues a certificate to a subject of domain B there is no mechanism
in place to detect or prevent this malicious activity. Domains must trust one another and
not issue certificates to subjects outside their domain.
Summary
This project set out to identify a potential solution for MLS data dissemination by
leveraging existing technologies and concepts. However, prior to addressing a solution,
six test scenarios were developed that identified various violations that can occur from
incorrect mapping. The six test scenarios demonstrate the impacts on security related
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to incorrect mapping, specifically, how the direction of trust and the privileges play a
role in violations. The six test scenarios contribute by providing additional insight into
violations that was missing within the literature review. Although the test scenarios
provided valuable insight, more research is needed to fully understand and formalize
the violations. Additionally, the MLS policy are represented using SPKI name and
authorization certificates and tested using Prolog. Leveraging Prolog allowed for testing
the logic behind SPKI certificates, and contributed to the overall solution by providing
a logical model. Additional prototyping is necessary to ensure the mechanics work in a
real-world setting. However, as mentioned previously a small modification to the SPKI
name certificate is necessary to accommodate restricted dissemination. Finally, bringing
together MLS, SPKI, Active Bundle, and a directory server provided a proposed solution,
additional research is required to refine the theory. For example, throughout this project,
the directory server is mentioned several times. However, the mechanics behind how it
will provide the functions necessary for domains to exchange MLS related information
was not covered and more research is required.
59
APPENDIX A
ABBREVIATIONS
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AB Active Bundle
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BLP Bell-La Padula
DAC Discretionary Access Control
MAC Mandatory Access Control
MLS Multi-Level Security
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
SDSI Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure
SPKI Simple Public Key Infrastructure
RBAC Role-Based Access Control
VM Virtual Machine
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APPENDIX B
TEST SCENARIO NOTATION
62
Notation examples The following examples depict two domains (DA and DB) each with
a single security level (High and TS). A domain with only one security level would be
uncommon within an MLS environment; however, the examples are simplified in order to
explain the notation.
One-way full trust Domain DA fully trusts domain DB, therefore, DA High fully trusts
DB TS. The solid line depicts full trust, meaning both read and write privileges. The
arrow depicts the direction of trust, in this case DA High is trusting DB TS. Therefore,
DB TS can both read and write to DA High, whereas DA High cannot read or write to
DB TS.
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Two-way full trust Domain DA fully trusts domain DB, therefore, DA High fully trusts
DB TS. In addition, domain DB fully trusts domain DA, therefore, DB TS fully trusts
DA High. The solid line depicts full trust, meaning both read and write privileges. The
arrow shows that DA High is trusting DB TS, and DB TS is trusting DA High. Therefore,
DB TS can both read and write to DA High, and DA High can read and write to DB TS.
One-way partial trust (read) Domain DA partially trusts domain DB with read
privileges, therefore, DA High partially trusts DB TS. The short-dashed line depicts partial
trust in the form of read privileges, meaning DB TS can read from DA High, whereas
DA High cannot read or write to DB TS.
One-way partial trust (write) Domain DA partially trusts domain DB with write
privileges, therefore, DA High partially trusts DB TS. The long-dashed line depicts partial
trust in the form of write privileges, meaning DB TS can write to DA High, whereas
DA High cannot read or write to DB TS.
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Two-way partial trust (read) Domain DA partially trusts domain DB, therefore,
DA High partially trusts DB TS. In addition, domain DB partially trusts domain DA,
therefore, DB TS partially trusts DA High. The short-dashed line depicts partial trust in
the form of read privileges, meaning DB TS can read from DA High, and DA High can
read from DB TS.
Two-way partial trust (write) Domain DA partially trusts domain DB, therefore,
DA High partially trusts DB TS. In addition, domain DB partially trusts domain DA,
therefore, DB TS partially trusts DA High. The long-dashed line depicts partial trust in the
form of write privileges, meaning DB TS can write to DA High, and DA High can write to
DB TS.
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APPENDIX C
PROLOG IMPLEMENTATION
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Objects and Subjects
/*Active Bundle labels for Objects*/ (1)
object sl(”K AB o1”,”K AB Low”). (2)
object sl(”K AB o2”,”K AB Medium”). (3)
object sl(”K AB o3”, ”K AB High”). (4)
/*Army Subject (Key, Clearance, Issuer)*/ (5)
subject sl(”K Alice”,”K ARMY TopSecret:{bio}”,”K ARMY”). (6)
subject sl(”K Bob”,”K ARMY Secret:{bio}” ,”K ARMY”). (7)
subject sl(”K Tom”,”K ARMY Secret:{}” ,”K ARMY”). (8)
/*Air Force Subjects*/ (9)
subject sl(”K Kevin”,”K AirForce TopSecret:{}” ,”K AirForce”). (10)
subject sl(”K Rob”,”K AirForce Secret:{}” ,”K AirForce”). (11)
/*NAVY Subjects*/ (12)
subject sl(”K Nick”,”K Navy TopSecret:{}” ,”K Navy”). (13)
subject sl(”K Nancy”,”K Navy Secret:{}” ,”K Navy”). (14)
/*Marines*/ (15)
subject sl(”K Matt”,”K Marien TopSecret:{}” ,”K Marine”). (16)
subject sl(”K Mark”,”K Marine Secret:{}” ,”K Marine”). (17)
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Authorization Policies (SPKI Auth Certs)
/*Authorization Policy auth policy(Principal, Operation, Object, Subject)*/ (18)
/*High*/ (19)
auth policy(”K AB”,read,”K AB o1”,”K AB High”). (20)
auth policy(”K AB”,read,”K AB o2”,”K AB High”). (21)
auth policy(”K AB”,read,”K AB o3”,”K AB High”). (22)
auth policy(”K AB”,write,”K AB o3”,”K AB High”). (23)
/*Medium*/ (24)
auth policy(”K AB”,read,”K AB o1”,”K AB Medium”). (25)
auth policy(”K AB”,read,”K AB o2”,”K AB Medium”). (26)
auth policy(”K AB”,write,”K AB o2”,”K AB Medium”). (27)
auth policy(”K AB”,write,”K AB o3”,”K AB Medium”). (28)
/*Low*/ (29)
auth policy(”K AB”,read,”K AB o1”,”K AB Low”). (30)
auth policy(”K AB”,write,”K AB o1”,”K AB Low”). (31)
auth policy(”K AB”,write,”K AB o2”,”K AB Low”). (32)
auth policy(”K AB”,write,”K AB o3”,”K AB Low”). (33)
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Trust Policy (SPKI Name Certs)
/*Restricted Dissemination*/ (34)
trust(”K AB Medium”, ”K ARMY Secret:{bio}”, (35)
trust(”K ARMY Secret:{bio}”,”K ARMY”)). (36)
/*Unrestricted Dissemination*/ (37)
/*AB Trust Policy (Trustor, Trustee, Dissemination Restriction)*/ (38)
trust(”K AB High”, ”K ARMY TopSecret:{bio}”). (39)
trust(”K AB Low”, ”K ARMY Secret:{}”). (40)
/*Army Issued Trust Certificate to Air Force*/ (41)
trust(”K ARMY TopSecret:{bio}”,”K AirForce TopSecret:{}”). (42)
trust(”K ARMY Secret:{bio}”,”K AirForce Secret:{}”). (43)
/*Air Force Issued Trust Certificate to Navy*/ (44)
trust(”K AirForce TopSecret:{}”,”K Navy TopSecret:{}”). (45)
/*Navy Issued Trust Certificate to Mariens*/ (46)
trust(”K Navy TopSecret:{}”,”K Marien TopSecret:{}”). (47)
trusts(X, Y):- trust(X,Y, trust(Y,Z)), subject sl( ,Y, Z),nl, (48)
write(’Restricted Dissemination’). (49)
trusts(X, Y):- trust(X,Y),nl, write(’Unrestricted Dissemination’). (50)
trusts(X, Y):- trust(X,Z), trust(Z,Y),nl, write(’Unrestricted Dissemination’). (51)
trusts(X, Y):- trust(X,Z), trusts(Z,Y),nl, write(’Unrestricted Dissemination’). (52)
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Access Check
/*If a trust relationship can be established*/ (53)
accessGrant(Subject Key, Operation, Object Name) :- (54)
subject sl(Subject Key, Subject sl, ), (55)
object sl(Object Name, ), (56)
trusts(X, Subject sl), (57)
auth policy(”K AB”,Operation,Object Name, X). (58)
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User Help
list Auth Policy:- auth policy(Issuer, Operation, Object, Subject), (59)
write(’Issuer: ’),tab(13),write(Issuer),nl, (60)
write(’Operation: ’),tab(7),write(Operation),nl, (61)
write(’Object: ’),tab(12),write(Object),nl, (62)
write(’Subject: ’),tab(10),write(Subject),nl. (63)
list Subjects:- subject sl(Name, Clearance, Issuer), (64)
write(’Subjet Key: ’),tab(4),write(Name),nl, (65)
write(’Clearance: ’),tab(6),write(Clearance),nl, (66)
write(’Issuer: ’),tab(12),write(Issuer),nl. (67)
list Objects:- object sl(Classification, Key), (68)
write(”Object’s Key: ”),tab(6),write(Key),nl, (69)
write(’Classification: ’),tab(6),write(Classification),nl. (70)
list Trust:- trust(Issuer, Subject), write(’Issuer: ’),tab(12),write(Issuer),nl, (71)
write(’Subject: ’),tab(10),write(Subject),nl, (72)
write(’Unrestricted Dissemination’),nl. (73)
list Trust:- trust(Issuer, Subject,trust( ,Domain Key)), (74)
write(’Issuer: ’),tab(12),write(Issuer),nl, (75)
write(’Subject: ’),tab(10),write(Subject),nl, (76)
write(’Valid Only if Issued By: ’), write(Domain Key),nl, (77)
write(’Restricted Dissemination’),nl. (78)
71
APPENDIX D
NOTATION AND SYNTAX
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A brief description of the notation and syntax used is provided within this appendix.
Di denotes a domain whose name is i. For example, DArmy, and DAB represent the
domains of Army and AB(Active Bundle) respectively. Note that we treat an Active
Bundle construct as a domain.
Resourcei represents a set of all the resources (both objects and subjects) in the domain
Di. Where i represents the domain. For example, RArmy denotes a set of all the objects and
subjects of the domain DArmy.
Oi represents a single object within some domain, where i represents the name of the
object. When referencing an object in this manner a reference to the domain will be
included. For example, O1 within the AB (KMLS AB) denotes O1 is an object within the
domain KMLS AB.
KMLS Name SecLevel : {ca set} represents a security level or label of the domain DName.
• KMLS Name is a public key responsible for assigning security levels to resources in
RName.
• SecLevel denote the sensitivity (clearance/classification) level.
• ca set denote the a set of categories or compartments of the domain DName. Note
that ca set is optional and can remain blank, {}.
• For example, KMLS Army TopSecret : {chem, nuke} is a security level of the
domain DArmy, with a sensitivity of Top Secret, and compartments of both chem
and nuke. Furthermore, KMLS Navy Con f idential : {bio} is a security level of the
domain DNavy and has a sensitivity of Confidential with a compartment of bio.
Li represents a single security level within a domain. For example li could represent
TS : {bio,chem} within the DArmy.
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li represents the set of all the security levels or labels of domain Di.
Li represents a security level lattice of the domain Di, Li = 〈Li,≥i〉.
sli is a function which returns the security level of an object or subject in the domain Di.
For instance, slArmy(ob) = KArmy TS : {bio,chem}, if ob ∈ ResourceArmy.
≥x represents a dominance relationship within an individual lattice Lx of the domain
Dx. For example, lm≥xln means lm, ln ∈ Lx and lm dominates ln.
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